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PRESERVATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS: FINDING THE PROPER BALANCE
BETWEEN EXPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION IN
WORKS OF ART
Cecilia Chung*
I. INTRODUCTION
Andy Warhol is perhaps one of the most recognized and
influential American artists of the twentieth century, and is
well known for his juxtaposition of art and popular culture.
Warhol's work reflects America's preoccupation and
association with famous brands and celebrities. For instance,
he ingeniously merged everything from mundane, commercial
objects such as Campbell's soup cans and Coca-Cola bottles to
images of mega-celebrities including Marilyn Monroe and
Elvis into works of art. Despite the commercial nature of
Warhol's artwork, few would object to the proposition that it
is entitled to protection under the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, under similar circumstances, celebrities are
asserting their property rights to prevent the unauthorized
use of a persona in works of art, memorabilia, caricatures,
and editorials.
The ownership of intellectual property presents a unique
problem because this type of property can be owned by an
unlimited number of individuals at any given time.' For
instance, a famous actor may claim that he owns his persona
and that this right of publicity is protected as intellectual
property. However, an actor is paid to personify a character,
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., Mass Communications, B.A., History,
University of California, Berkeley.
1. See MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 17-19 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing intellectual property rights in
general).
889
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
which in most instances was created by someone else. In this
case, both the actor as well as a creator's character may claim
a right to the personified character. An interesting question
arises with respect to an individual's right to assert
ownership of his or her personality or identity. Moreover,
when personality or identity rights become intertwined with
income, the problem often devolves into a legal battle.2 The
legal controversy involves control over one's public image and
the reaping of economic rewards brought on by celebrity
status.
The right of publicity is defined as the "inherent right of
every human being to control the commercial use of his or her
identity."3 By 1953, courts recognized the right of publicity as
an outgrowth of the right to privacy.4 Moreover, "[a]lthough
the right of publicity has been recognized as a distinct
common-law doctrine since 1953, only in recent years have
courts begun to take the First Amendment seriously as a
limit on the extent to which . . . celebrities can use the
doctrine to control the use of their images."5  Today, the
tension between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment is widely recognized in the legal community,6
reflected by a need to draw a line between free riding and free
expression. On the one hand, "[a] rich and varied public
domain is essential to a properly functioning system of
2. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003);
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996);
World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
413 (W.D.Pa 2003); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001); Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
3. J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d
ed. 2001).
4. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953).
5. Tyler Trent Ochoa, ETW Corp v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: Introduction:
Tiger Woods and the First Amendment, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 381, 383 (2000).
6. See, e.g., F. Jay Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The
"Transformativeness" Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right
of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
1 (2003); Jason K. Levine, Can the Right of Publicity Afford Free Speech? A New
Right of Publicity Test for First Amendment Cases, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 171 (2004); Daniel E. Wanat, Article, Entertainment Law: An Analysis of
Judicial Decision-Making in Cases Where a Celebrity's Publicity Right is in
Conflict with a User's First Amendment Right, 67 ALB. L. REV. 251 (2003).
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intellectual property so that creators will have free access to
the raw material they need to fashion new works for the
public. So, too, is a rich public domain crucial to the
enjoyment of First Amendment freedoms."7 On the other
hand, society seemingly finds some inherent injustice in
reaping the fruits of another's labor.
Neither Congress nor the United States Supreme Court
has created a bright-line rule to balance First Amendment
interests against the right of publicity.' The courts,
depending on the jurisdiction, employ various common law
tests to resolve disputes concerning the right of publicity
where the First Amendment is an asserted defense. This
comment argues that the current tests used by the courts are
vague and lack uniformity, 9 resulting in a chilling effect on
speech. Artists who draw from the public domain and whose
contributions enrich the public domain are burdened most.
For instance, artists who depict celebrities in their work are
likely to face opposition where a celebrity finds the artist's
message unfavorable, or where the celebrity demands
compensation from the artist. Due to the chilling effect of
litigation on free expression, if the right of publicity is to be
properly balanced against the First Amendment, courts
should use a uniform standard to address the right of
publicity.
Part II of this comment describes the historical
development of the right of publicity10 and discusses the
various ways in which state and federal courts have
inadequately resolved the tension between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity.' Part III discusses
the two most recent balancing tests adopted by the Supreme
Courts of California 2 and Missouri 13 to illustrate the need for
7. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, ETW Corp v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.:
Amicus Curiae Brief of Seventy-Three Law Professors in Support of
Defendant/Appellee Jireh Publishing, Inc., 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 391, 414
(2000).
8. The only case heard by the United States Supreme Court to date that
discusses and attempts to resolve the tension between the First Amendment
and the right of publicity is Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562 (1977).
9. See discussion infra Part IV.A-C.
10. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
11. See discussion infra Part II.C.
12. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001) (applying the transformative use test).
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a more uniform standard. Part IV identifies the weaknesses
of these two tests and show how a clearer standard would
strengthen courts' rulings in this area of law.14 Part V
proposes that the United States Supreme Court clarify the
standards to be used when balancing the right of publicity
and the First Amendment. In addition, it also proposes that
Congress lobby for a statute that ensures uniformity in the
outcomes of litigation. 5 This may prove to be a difficult
proposition because the right of publicity has generally been
governed by state law. 16  However, uniform and rational
bright-line rules may lead to less frustration on the part of
plaintiffs and less litigation in the long run.
II. BACKGROUND-EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Historical Roots: The Right of Privacy
In their famous article, The Right to Privacy, Louis
Brandeis and Samuel Warren articulated concern that the
media had become an encroachment into "the sacred precincts
of private and domestic life ... ."" Fearful that the media
overstepped in every direction, 8 Brandeis and Warren
discussed the consequences of modern enterprise and
invention that had the ability to subject society to mental
pain and distress, oftentimes far greater than that which
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. 9 Furthermore,
Brandeis and Warren suggested that protection of society
must stem from the rights of individuals, so that an injured
individual can recover compensation under the law for a
violation of the right of publicity.2 ° In other words, to offset
the media's intrusion into areas where citizens had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, individuals must have a
legal cause of action against violations of this right.
13. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (applying the
predominant purpose test).
14. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. See discussion infra Part V.
16. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 3:1.
17. See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
18. Id. at 196.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 215.
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Since the conception of the right to privacy, there has
been tension between the right to one's persona and the First
Amendment. 2' Absent actual defamation, a private citizen
whose persona or likeness was taken without permission
historically had no cause of action. One of the first cases to
address this tension was Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co.22 This case involved a commercial appropriation of a
private citizen's likeness on an advertisement for flour
without her permission.23 The private citizen, Roberson, was
unable to recover for the type of injury described by the
Brandeis and Warren article because New York refused to
recognize any common law right of privacy.24 However,
shortly thereafter, due in part to public outrage, the New
York legislature passed a law that recognized an individual's
cause of action for violation of the right to privacy.
In 1905, Georgia became the first state to recognize a
common law right to privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co. 26  Like Roberson, the case involved the
unauthorized use of the plaintiffs likeness in an
advertisement, this time for life insurance .2  The Georgia
Supreme Court found that the right to privacy is a natural
right, and that such privacy rights have always coexisted
with the First Amendment and could still be harmonized.28
21. Levine, supra note 6, at 176.
22. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 447 (holding that the right of privacy is not one of the ills that can
be redressed under the law).
25. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2004) ("A person, firm or
corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the
name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the
written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.").
26. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (holding
that an individual has a right to privacy which can be enforced and which the
courts will protect against invasion).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 73 ("The stumbling block which many have encountered in the
way of a recognition of the existence of a right of privacy has been that the
recognition of such right would inevitably tend to curtail the liberty of speech
and of the press. The right to speak and the right of privacy have been
coexistent. Each is a natural right, each exists, and each must be recognized
and enforced with due respect for the other.").
2006] 893
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B. Creation of the Right of Publicity
In 1953, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the
first court to recognize the concept that is now referred to as
the "right of publicity,"29 in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.3 ° This case involved an exclusive contract
between a seller of chewing gum and a baseball player for use
of the player's photograph in connection with the sale of
gum.3 1 With knowledge of this preexisting contract, a rival
company deliberately induced the same baseball player to
simultaneously authorize use of his photos and thus breach
his preexisting exclusive contract.32
The court rejected the contention that plaintiffs contract
did not vest any property right in the plaintiff.3 3 The court
ruled that "in addition to and independent of that right of
privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made 'in gross' . . . .",3 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
prominent persons such as actors and ball-players would be
sorely deprived if they could not receive money for use of their
likenesses in public places.
Six years later, Professor William Prosser published his
famous article on torts36 providing what are now considered
the definitive elements of the privacy cause of action. In
this definition, he included the right of publicity, the type of
claim that Professor Melville Nimmer argued was protected
under the right of publicity following Haelan.3 Prosser
divided the right to privacy into four categories: 1) intrusion
29. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 867.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 868.
34. Id.
35. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. Following Haelan, Professor Melville Nimmer
provided extensive scholarly analysis of the right of publicity. Melville B.
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
Nimmer argued that because people expend considerable time, effort, skill and
money to achieve publicity value of substantial pecuniary worth, the publicity
right should be comparable to a property right. Id.
36. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
37. BARRETT, supra note 1, at 1025.
38. See Nimmer, supra note 35.
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upon the plaintiffs seclusion, solitude, or private affairs, 2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff, 3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye, and 4) appropriation of the plaintiffs name
or likeness for the defendant's advantage. 9 The inclusion of
both private and public plaintiffs in this category blurred of
the distinction between the right to privacy and the right of
publicity identified by Haelan.4 °
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in its first and only right of publicity case: Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company.4  Zacchini
involved an alleged commercial misappropriation of an
entertainer's human cannonball act.42  The defendant
videotaped the plaintiffs entire act and broadcasted it on the
news.43  The United States Supreme Court overturned the
Ohio Supreme Court and held that the First Amendment did
not shield the defendant from liability." The Court's primary
concern was the substantial economic threat posed by
broadcast of the plaintiffs performance because if the public
can see the act for free on television, then they would be less
willing to pay to see it live. 45  The Court also made a
distinction between the unauthorized use of a person's name
or likeness for purposes of trade and the incidental use of a
performer's name or likeness by the press.46 In this case,
such a distinction was especially justified because the
broadcast went "to the heart of the petitioner's ability to earn
a living."47
In 1979, the California Supreme Court decided the next
seminal case involving the right of publicity in Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures." Lugosi involved the postmortem
39. Prosser, supra note 36, at 389.
40. See BARRErT, supra note 1, at 1025.
41. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
42. Id. at 565.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 575-76. The tension between the First Amendment and the right
of publicity is evident in this case. While society may be enriched by broadcast
of Zacchini's act, the court heavily weighs the inequitable result in favor of
Zacchini. Id.
46. Id.
47. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-77. See also infra Part I.C. for a more
extensive discussion of the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
48. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
2006] 895
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publicity rights of Bela Lugosi and the use of his likeness as
Count Dracula in connection with the sale of commercial
merchandise.49  The majority found that Lugosi neither
portrayed himself nor created the character of Dracula, but
merely acted out a popular role that became well known over
time.50  Therefore, he could not control exploitation of the
Count Dracula character.5' Because his performance gave
him no more of a claim to Count Dracula than any other actor
who also played a memorable role, Lugosi had no inheritable
property right. 2
In contrast, the dissent in Lugosi argued that a separate
right of publicity was needed to protect a celebrity's interest
in the economic value of commercial use of his name or
likeness.53 The dissent also argued that this interest should
be inheritable because it was proprietary during the
celebrity's lifetime.54  As a matter of course, five years after
the decision in Lugosi, the California legislature passed a
statute recognizing postmortem rights of publicity.5
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals broadened
the common law definition of the right of publicity 6 in White
v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.57 This case involved an
advertisement for Samsung video cassette recorders (VCRs)
which evoked the image of Vanna White.58 Although the
49. See id. at 426-27.
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court also notes that a contract specifying the postmortem
publicity right of the Count Dracula character in Lugosi and his heirs might
have resulted in a different outcome. Id.
53. Id. at 444-45 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
54. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 447 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
55. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2004) ("Any person who uses a
deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purpose of advertising
or selling, or soliciting purchases, of products, merchandise, goods, or services,
without prior consent from the person or persons specified. . . shall be liable for
any damages sustained by the person or person injured thereof.").
56. This right was initially articulated by the California Court of Appeals.
See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1983). The common law
cause of action for the right of publicity may be plead by alleging: "(1) the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiffs
name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercial or otherwise; (3) lack of
consent; and (4) resulting injury." Id. at 417.
57. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
58. Id. at 1396 ("The ad depicted a robot, dressed in a wig, gown, and
jewelry ... consciously selected to resemble White's hair and dress. The robot
896 [Vol: 46
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majority held that the advertisement in question did not
appropriate White's name or likeness,59 it nevertheless found
in White's favor." The court held that a common law right of
publicity claim need not necessary be limited to an allegation
for appropriation of a name or likeness, but could also include
an image, identity or anything associated with the person."
Furthermore, the majority rejected the defendants' parody
defense 62 and stated that their arguments were better
addressed to non-commercial parodies.63 Both defendants'
arguments and those of the dissenters will be considered in
more detail below.64
In 1995, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 65
defined the right of publicity as the appropriation of the
"commercial value of a person's identity."6 6 The Restatement
recognized that the right of publicity is fundamentally
was posed next to a game board which is instantly recognizable as the Wheel of
Fortune game show set, in a stance for which White is famous. The caption of
the ad read: 'Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D."').
59. See id. at 1396-98.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1397-98.
62. Id. at 1401 ("The ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is
subservient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary message: 'buy
Samsung VCRs."').
63. Samsung, 971 F.2d at 1401. In disagreement with the dissent, Judge
Goodwin stated:
In warning of a first amendment chill to expressive conduct, the
dissent reads this decision too broadly . . . This case concerns only the
market which exists in our society for the exploitation of celebrity to
sell products, and an attempt to take a free ride on a celebrity's
celebrity value. Commercial advertising which relies on celebrity fame
is different from other forms of expressive activity in two crucial ways.
First, for celebrity exploitation advertising to be effective, the
advertisement must evoke the celebrity's identity. The more effective
the evocation, the better the advertisement. If, as Samsung claims, its
ad was based on a "generic" game-show hostess and not on Vanna
White, the ad would not have violated anyone's right of publicity, but it
would also not have been as humorous or as effective.
Second, even if some forms of expressive activity, such as parody, do
rely on identity evocation, the first amendment hurdle will bar most
right of publicity actions against those activities.
Id. at 1401 n.3 (citations omitted).
64. See discussion infra Part II.C.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
66. Id. ("One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity
by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate
under the rules stated [herein].").
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constrained by public policy and constitutional interests in
the freedom of expression." The authors further stated that
"[t]he use of a person's identity primarily for the purpose of
communicating information or expressing ideas is not
generally actionable as a violation of the person's right of
publicity."68  This limitation was not restricted to news
reporting but also extended to entertainment and other
creative works.69  The Restatement, however, stated that
protection would be limited if either the name or likeness was
used solely to attract attention to a work unrelated to the
identified person, or if the work contained substantial
falsifications.7 °
C. The Scope of the Right of Publicity and the First
Amendment
Currently, the right of publicity is generally known as
the right to control the use of one's own name, picture, or
likeness in order to prevent others from using it, without
consent, for commercial benefit.71 While each state sets forth
its own right of publicity standards, the right is generally
recognized as based in common law, and often supplemented
by statute.72 While most courts agree on the elements that
establish the right of publicity cause of action,7 3 whether or
not the use of a person's identity is protected under the First
67. Id. § 47 cmt. c.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 3:2.
72. See id. §§ 6:1-6:127. Seven states, including New York, recognize a
statutory right of publicity. Id. The following states recognize a common law
right of publicity: Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. Id. Furthermore, ten additional
states have statutes protecting the right of privacy, but are worded in such a
way to embody the right of publicity: Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Washington. Id.
73. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003);
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996);
World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
413 (W.D.Pa 2003); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001); Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
898 [Vol: 46
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Amendment remains unresolved.
Generally, courts apply four main approaches to
determine whether expression under the First Amendment is
protected at the expense of the right of publicity.74 Under the
first approach, courts evaluate whether the use by a
defendant is commercial or non-commercial in nature.75
Under the second approach, courts take into account whether
the use is a parody.76 Under the third approach, courts may
consider whether the use is transformative77 as compared to
the original work.7" Under the final approach, courts assess
whether the predominant purpose of the use is expressive or
commercial. 79  This comment will focus on the last two
approaches, and in particular, will examine the legitimacy of
each approach.
1. Commercial Speech
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Zacchini, lower
courts have recognized that commercial speech has special
meaning within the context of the First Amendment.8" While
commercial speech8 ' is entitled to some First Amendment
protection; it is not entitled to the same level of protection as
other types of protected expression. 2 Thus, the threshold
74. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 6, at 180-84, 216-21; Wanat, supra note 6,
at 256-70.
75. See, e.g., Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1180.
76. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1395 (9th
Cir. 1992); World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 413; Cardtoons, 95
F.3d at 972.
77. A transformative use is one in which the alleged infringing work
supersedes the original work. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 809. Cf L. Batlin
& Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1976) (defining
transformative as something more than a "merely trivial variation").
78. See, e.g., ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 915; Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 797;
Winter, 69 P.3d at 473.
79. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
80. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184-85.
81. Commercial speech is defined as speech that "does no more than propose
a commercial transaction" Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). See also Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. v. Public Servs. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial
speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience."). Central Hudson also set forth the test of whether certain
commercial expression would be protected under the First Amendment. Id. at
566.
82. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184-85 (citing prior cases that have addressed
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
question for some courts when publicity rights are at odds
with the First Amendment has often been whether the
expression in question is commercial or non-commercial.8 3
Although the Court has concluded that the commercial
nature of speech is irrelevant for purposes of determining
whether such speech comes within the First Amendment,'
lower courts have rarely given protection to the use of a
person's identity when the use is for a purely commercial
purpose. 5
Today, because celebrity endorsements have enormous
selling power and because public perception of any particular
celebrity affects their fame, celebrities have an interest in the
products on which their photographs or likenesses appear.
For instance, in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,6 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Los Angeles
Magazine's ("LAM") article featuring digitally altered
photographs of actors and their famous characters wearing
modern fashion designs was not commercial speech and was
therefore entitled to the full First Amendment protection
accorded to non-commercial speech. The court determined
that any commercial aspect of LAM's article was inextricably
intertwined with expression and this was fully protected. 88
After Hoffman, courts were left with two important
considerations when balancing the conflict between the right
the nature of and constitutional protection given to commercial speech). See,
e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-65.
83. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977);
Hoffman, 255 F.3d 1180; Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d 797.
84. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. However, the Court also
noted that there are certain circumstances where First Amendment protection
would not be provided, such as when speech falls in the realm of false or
deceptive advertising. Id.
85. See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding that Abercrombie's use of surfer's photographs in it's catalog was
significantly commercial in nature and thus not entitled to full First
Amendment protection); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395,
1397-99 (9th Cir 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462-64 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that when a distinctive voice of a celebrity singer is imitated to
sell a product, the sellers have misappropriated her voice).
86. Hoffman, 255 F.3d 1180 (involving a cause of action for commercial
misappropriation of an actor's likeness in an article which used computer
technology to alter famous film stills).
87. Id. at 1185-87.
88. Id. at 1185 (describing the article as "a combination of fashion
photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial comment on classic films
and famous actors").
900 [Vol: 46
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of publicity and the First Amendment: "(1) whether the
purpose of the use is definitively advertising to sell a product;
and (2) whether the commercial quality of the use, if any, is
inseparable from expressive content."
8 9
2. Parody
First Amendment protection is unconditionally granted
to certain types of expression such as parody. In the
copyright context, parody is often viewed as a fair use,9°
allowing for use of a work for a limited purpose, despite the
exclusive copyright law rights vested in an author. In his
dissenting opinion in White v. Samsung, Judge Kozinski
made a passionate and compelling argument in support of a
rich public domain.91 This called for a parody exception to the
right of publicity, even where commercial speech was
involved.92 Judge Kozinski argued that the First Amendment
was a means to protect not only the free development of
culture, but also of religion and politics. 93 Accordingly, Judge
Kozinski viewed parody as one of the vital components to the
marketplace of ideas.94
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also examined the
parody defense in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Association.95 Here, while the court recognized the
89. Wanat, supra note 6, at 257.
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("[Tlhe fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by [§§ 106 and 106A], for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
91. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from order rejecting rehearing en banc).
92. Id. at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order rejecting rehearing en
banc).
Under the majority's opinion, it's now a tort for advertisers to remind
the public of a celebrity. Not to use a celebrity's name, voice, signature
or likeness; not to imply the celebrity endorses a product; but simply to
evoke the celebrity's image in the public's mind. This Orwellian notion
withdraws far more from the public domain than prudence and
common sense allow .... It raises serious First Amendment problems.
It's bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second look.
Id. at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order rejecting rehearing en banc).
93. Id. at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order rejecting rehearing en
banc).
94. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order rejecting rehearing en banc).
95. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959
(10th Cir. 1996). The court held that the expressive materials found on the
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social value served by parodies, it also found that they were
not per se protected. 96 A more recent decision that addressed
the parody defense was World Wrestling Federation
Entertainment, Inc. v. Big Dog Holding, Inc.97 In this case,
the court held that the defendant's use of World Wrestling
Federation Entertainment's ("WWE") character caricatures
on its merchandise, was an important form of expressive
commentary which deserved First Amendment protection.9"
The court followed the framework of Cardtoons and found
that the defendant added significant artistic and imaginative
expression to its graphics.9 9 These contributions superseded
any interest in the protection of WWE's publicity right.1"'
3. Transformative Use
The California Supreme Court adopted what has become
known as the transformative use test in its recent ruling in
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.'1 The
transformative use test attempts to strike a balance between
the First Amendment and the right of publicity. °2 Comedy
III involved a cause of action against Saderup, a professional
artist who created and sold copies of a charcoal drawing of the
Three Stooges without permission from the Stooges'
estates. 3 Although the court found expressive elements in
Saderup's work, it rejected his First Amendment defense. 04
trading cards in question contained various artistic and literary devices, namely
parody. Id. at 969-70.
96. Wanat, supra note 6, at 265.
97. World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc., v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F.
Supp. 2d 413 (W.D.Pa. 2003). This case involved the sale of merchandise which
poked fun, mocked, and ridiculed certain well-known wrestling characters
whose intellectual property rights were owned WWE. Id. at 418.
98. Id. at 445.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
102. Id. at 799.
103. Id. at 800-02. Lithographic prints of the drawings as well as T-shirts
with the drawing printed on it were sold. Id. at 800-01. However, the
"lithographs and T-shirts did not constitute an advertisement, endorsement, or
sponsorship of any product." Id. at 801.
104. Id. at 803. The court also points out that other courts often observe that
"entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the
exposition of ideas." Id. at 804 (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods.,
603 P.2d 454, 458-59 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring)). Furthermore, the fact
that Saderup's expression takes the form of visual representation does not
remove it from First Amendment protection. Id. at 804.
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The court looked at the purposes of the First Amendment 0 5
and adopted an element of the fair use test employed by
copyright law. 10 6 Accordingly, it stated that the inquiry was
"whether a product containing a celebrity's likeness is so
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant's
expression rather than the celebrity's likeness."107 The court
noted that this inquiry should be conducted quantitatively
rather than qualitatively. 0 8  In other words, as opposed to
looking at the work as a whole, a court must assess whether
the literal, imitative, or the creative elements predominate
the work in such a way as to make the work
transformative.0 9  Ultimately, the court ruled against
Saderup because it did not discern any significant
transformative or creative input in his work. 10
Winter v. DC Comics"' and ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publishing, Inc."' are two recent cases that have applied the
transformative use test and have ruled in favor of an artist's
right to the protection of publicity under the First
Amendment. In Winter, the California Supreme Court found
that a comic book which contained the likeness of two famous
singers as half-worm, half-human villains possessed
significant creative elements that transformed them into
105. Id. at 803. The purposes stated were "to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas" and a "fundamental respect for individual development
and self-realization." Id. (citing Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 458 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring)).
106. See id. at 808-09. The court adopted the "purpose and character of use"
element of the fair use test used in copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
This element was deemed pertinent in reconciling the rights of expression and
publicity because a new work that supersedes "the original creation, or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character" furthers the
goal of intellectual property rights; that of promoting the science and the arts.
Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808-09.
107. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 809. The court also notes that expression
"means[s] expression of something other than the likeness of the celebrity." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 809 n.11 (comparing and disagreeing with the ruling in ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000)).
110. Id. at 811. But see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th
Cir. 2003) (finding that a work of art consisting of a collage of images in
addition to the likeness of Tiger Woods contains significant transformative
elements); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding that alternation of a photograph using computer technology would be
sufficient for purposes of the transformative use test).
111. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
112. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d 915.
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something more than mere celebrity likenesses.1 3 The court
stated that while the fictional characters were hardly subtle
evocations of the Winter brothers, the books did not literally
depict them. 114 Thus, to the extent that the drawings of the
comic book characters resembled the plaintiffs, such
resemblances were distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody,
or caricature.1 5 Moreover, the comic book characters did not
affect the plaintiffs' right of publicity in the economic sense
because fans who sought pictures or drawings of the Winter
Brothers would have found the comic book characters an
unsatisfactory substitute." 6
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals similarly found that artwork that included
the likeness of Tiger Woods contained significant
transformative elements making it worthy of First
Amendment protection under the transformative use test.117
The court found that the work was a piece of art, portraying a
historic moment in sports history,"" and was thus more than
a mere literal likeness of Tiger Woods." 9 Viewing the two
works as a whole, the artwork in ETW contained a collage of
images to commemorate an event as opposed to a literal
depiction of a celebrity's likeness. Therefore, the distinction
between the work in question here and the charcoal drawings
in Comedy III was that the former did not capitalize solely on
a literal depiction of Tiger Woods. 1 °
4. Predominant Purpose
In contrast, the Missouri Supreme Court's 2003 ruling in
Doe v. TCI Cablevision12' adopted the predominant purpose
test to determine the circumstances under which the First
113. Winter, 69 P.3d at 476. This case involved a cause of action against DC
Comics by well known musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter for
misappropriation of their name and likeness. Id.
114. Id. at 479.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 938. This case involved a cause of action
against the publisher of a work created by Rick Rush, a sports artist, entitled
The Masters of Augusta, which contains the likeness of Tiger Woods. Id. at 918.
ETW is the licensing agent of Tiger Woods. Id.
118. Id. at 936.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 938.
121. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
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Amendment prevails over the right of publicity. In Doe, Tony
Twist, a former professional hockey player, brought a suit for
misappropriation after he learned that a villainous character
shared his name in the Spawn comic book series.122 However,
the fictional Tony Twist bore no physical resemblance to the
plaintiff. 123 Perhaps the only similarity between the two was
that both could be characterized as having "tough guy"
personas.'24 Nevertheless, the evidence showed that fans
associated the comic character with the real Tony Twist,
while the creators of Spawn benefited from the use of Tony
Twist's name. 12 5
In order to balance the comic book creator's First
Amendment right against the right of publicity, the Missouri
Supreme Court found that California's transformative use
test did not adequately consider that many uses of a person's
name and identity can have both expressive and commercial
components.126  Where both expressive and commercial
speech is involved, the court found that the predominant
purpose test provided a better balance between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity. 2  Therefore, the
proper inquiry is:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual's identity, that product
should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be
protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some
"expressive" content in it that might qualify as "speech" in
other circumstances. If on the other hand, the
predominant purpose of the product is to make an
expressive comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive
values could be given greater weight. 128
The court applied this test and held in favor of Tony
Twist because the use of his identity was predominately a
ploy to sell comics books and other merchandise unrelated to
122. Id. at 365.
123. Id. at 366.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 367.
126. Id. at 374.
127. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
128. Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in
Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
471, 500 (2003))
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any interest in artistic or literary expression. 129
III. LEGAL PROBLEM-LIMITING GROWTH OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN AND CHILLING FREE SPEECH
The purpose of any intellectual property right is to
encourage creativity, promote diversity, and preserve a
competitive marketplace.13 ° In part, this goal is achieved both
by the placement of ideas into the public domain and respect
for the First Amendment.13 ' Therefore, the overprotection of
intellectual property is just as dangerous as under-
protection.132 However, the incentive for creativity is tied up
in the expectation that creators will benefit from the fruits of
their labor. 13 3 For example, a celebrity that expends time and
effort developing a character should be entitled to a property
right in his or her investment. On the other hand, the
argument can be made that celebrities, their likenesses and
their identities belong to the public domain because
celebrities are universal points of reference for the public,
allowing society to share a common experience and a
collective memory. 3 1 Celebrities allow people to make
connections to other people and across generations through
the characters they play and what they represent.
Given the central societal role celebrities play, protection
of their publicity rights should not come at the expense of the
public domain. The problem involves protection of expression
under the First Amendment and simultaneous preservation
of the right of publicity without inconsistent and arbitrary
results. Courts apply a variety of tests and consider
approaches such as the commercial or transformative nature
of the alleged use, and the predominant purpose of the use. 135
129. Id.
130. See BARRETr, supra note 1, at 2.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from order rejecting rehearing en banc).
133. See BARRETT, supra note 1, at 2-3.
134. JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 163 (1990).
135. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003);
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996);
World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
413 (W.D.Pa 2003); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001); Doe v. TCI
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All of these tests, however, have shortcomings. For example,
because commercial speech is afforded some First
Amendment protection,136 it is not clear whether expression is
commercial or non-commercial speech. Additionally,
protected expression 137  is often so intertwined with
commercial speech that the two cannot be separated. 138 The
transformative use test does not clearly define how much
transformation is needed in order for a work to be
protected.139  The predominant purpose test primarily
assesses whether expression is commercial and is thus a
heightened manifestation of the transformative use test.4 °
Consequently, the predominant purpose test calls for a
comparison of values while at the same time unduly
restricting First Amendment protection. Thus, with the
exception of parody, the tests currently imposed are vague
and lack concrete elements.
The application of vague tests results in inconsistent and
inefficient outcomes for both courts and litigants. Courts that
apply a variety of tests will be faced with a higher number of
appeals since litigants will advocate for the adoption of an
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
136. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527
U.S. 173 (1999) (setting forth a four part test to evaluate the constitutionality of
governmental regulation of speech that is commercial in nature).
137. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 601-03 (1998).
(giving examples of expression that are protected under the First Amendment).
Constitutional protection of artistic works turns not on the political
significance that may be attributable to such productions, though they
may indeed comment on the political, but simply on their expressive
character, which falls within a spectrum of protected "speech"
extending outward from the core of overtly political declarations. Put
differently, art is entitled to full protection because our "cultural life,"
just like our native politics, "rests upon [the] ideal" of governmental
viewpoint neutrality.
Id. at 602-03 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994))
(footnote omitted).
138. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185-86. (citing Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v.
City & County of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990) (showing
the difference between protected speech and speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction)).
139. See Dougherty, supra note 6, at 7, 22-28.
140. Recent Case, First Amendment-Right of Publicity-Missouri Supreme
Court Creates "Predominant Purpose" Test for First Amendment Defenses to
Publicity Right Claims-Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003),
cert. denied sub nom., Twist v. McFarlane, 2004 WL 46675 (U.S. Jan 12, 2004)
(No. 03-615), 117 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Case,
First Amendment-Right of Publicity].
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alternative test. Further, without a clear rule, litigants are
faced with inconsistent rights and obligations depending on
the jurisdiction in which they bring their claims. This leads
to the potential procedural problem of forum shopping. If the
right of publicity is over-protected at the expense of the First
Amendment, there will be a limited public domain as well as
a chilling effect on free speech.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Weaknesses of the Transformative Use Test
The transformative use test asks whether an original
work is a synthesis of a celebrity likeness or whether the
depiction of the celebrity is the main substance of the work in
question.'14  The test measures this by asking "whether a
product containing a celebrity's likeness is so transformed
that it has become primarily the defendant's own expression
rather than the celebrity's likeness."'
Unfortunately, the transformative use test has many
open-ended questions that preclude it from providing a
workable resolution. Most notably, the test does not clearly
define the point at which expression becomes transformative.
In addition, the portion of the test requiring an inquiry into
the marketability and economic value of the challenged work
is difficult for courts because it is very subjective. Lastly, the
test will lead to the unintentional and undue chilling of free
speech and expression.
The court rejected Saderup's argument that all
portraiture involves creative decision and therefore merits
protection by the First Amendment.' 4 3 The court reasoned
that an artist "must contribute more than a 'merely trivial'
variation."44  To illustrate what constitutes sufficient
variation, the court referred to the portraits of Marilyn
Monroe and Elvis Presley created by Andy Warhol.141 The
141. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal.
2001).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 810.
144. Id. (quoting L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.
1976)).
145. Id. at 811 ("Through distortion and the careful manipulation of context,
Warhol was able to convey a message that went beyond the commercial
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court felt that Warhol's work was transformative because it
undeniably exhibited a departure from the conventional
celebrity portrait and entered the realm of social
commentary. 14 6  By referencing Warhol's art, the court
seemingly required that the artistic expression enter the
realm of social commentary in order to be considered
transformative. Such a standard, however, contradicts
precedent set by the United States Supreme Court which
states that a work of art is protected by the First Amendment
even if it conveys no discernable message.147
The transformative use test applied in Comedy III is
misleading because the court did not follow its own standard
for determining whether a work is transformative. As stated
above, it did not define what would constitute "more than a
'merely trivial' variation" or something "recognizably '[the
artist's] own.""'4 Although Saderup made charcoal drawings
of celebrities for over twenty-five years, 4 9 the court found his
drawings were not works that recognizably belonged to
him.150
The phrase "more than a merely trivial variation" was
prominently applied in a copyright case involving a plastic
reproduction of a toy bank 151 There, the court ruled that
changing the medium of expression from a cast iron toy bank
to a plastic toy bank was insufficient originality to warrant a
new copyright, and was therefore not entitled to First
Amendment protection.1 52 In contrast, the same cannot be
said of Saderup's charcoal drawing, since it was his original
creation. Thus, if transformativeness is more than a mere
trivial variation recognizably belonging to an artist, original
works of art that include the likeness of a celebrity should be
protected under the First Amendment.
Cases subsequent to Comedy III that have ruled in favor
exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on
the dehumanization of celebrity itself.").
146. Id.
147. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)).
148. Id. at 810 (quoting L. Batlin & Sons, 536 F.2d at 490).
149. Id. at 800.
150. Id. at 797.
151. L. Batlin & Sons, 536 F.2d at 490 (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)).
152. Id. at 491.
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of an artist's First Amendment right provide more guidance
as to what constitutes a transformative work. Shortly after
Comedy III, the Ninth Circuit, considered the transformative
use test in its ruling in Hoffman.5 ' The court noted that
Hoffman's body was edited out and a new, differently clothed
body was substituted in its place, making the photograph in
question significantly transformative.' Therefore, it is
possible to infer that a change in the composition of an
original photograph constitutes sufficient transformation.
In Comedy III, the court also stated that the inquiry of
transformativeness should be "more quantitative, rather than
qualitative."'55 The court did not mean to imply that a
specific numerical determination was necessary. Rather, the
court looked at whether some quantity of transformation was
made to the allegedly infringing work instead of using a pure
qualitative aesthetic analysis. A quantitative analysis is
difficult because it requires line-drawing and because it is
unclear as to how much expression must be added to an
original work to achieve transformativeness. Moreover, the
issue of who determines transformativeness is troubling
because artistic or aesthetic judgment is traditionally not the
role of judges and juries. Ultimately, it may become
necessary for courts to require testimony from an "is-it-
imaginative-or-is-it-creative expert,"1 56 thereby adding further
complication to existing litigation. The qualification such an
expert creates would be an entirely subjective task because it
is difficult to view art within a purely objective or analytical
framework.
As a secondary inquiry, the Comedy III court stated that
if the value of the work came principally from creativity, skill
and reputation of the artist rather than from a celebrity's
fame, then it could be presumed that there were sufficient
transformative elements to warrant First Amendment
153. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir.
2001). The court also considered factors such as whether the use was
commercial, whether the article contained expressive elements, and whether
there was an intent to deceive the reader of the article. See id. at 1184-89.
154. Id.
155. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal.
2001) ("The inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking
whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the
work.").
156. Levine, supra note 6, at 217.
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protection. 157  This inquiry is difficult to assess within the
context of any work in which a celebrity's likeness is
appropriated because of its inherent value. Even Andy
Warhol's social commentary on celebrities would have had
little value absent the celebrities' fame. Perhaps one might
argue that in Warhol's case, his skill and reputation
surpassed the fame of the celebrities, but very few artists are
likely to achieve his level of celebrity.
In 2003, the Sixth Circuit also recognized
transformativeness in an artist's creation in ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Publishing, Inc. 58 The court reasoned that since the
artist's work was a "collage of images combined to describe, in
artistic form, a historic event in sports history," the work
contained significant transformative elements.15 9  The
significant factor of this work was its combination of images.
Thus, while an image of Tiger Woods alone might not have
received constitutional protection, Tiger Woods's likeness in
combination with the likenesses of other golf legends sufficed
to pass the transformative threshold.
In summary, Hoffman and ETW Corp. both indicate that
if Saderup's work included an element that changed the way
in which the Three Stooges were commonly depicted, or if
Saderup chose to combine the likeness of the Three Stooges
with other comedians or a historical event, then his portraits
would have been considered transformative.
The final weakness of the transformative use test is that
it quickly chills free speech.16 0  For example, celebrity
depictions created with any skill will become a thing of the
past, while artists either will have to pay for the right to
depict celebrities in their work or refrain from depicting them
altogether. Celebrity impersonators will also face the
negative effects of the transformative use test; for instance,
poor imitators will be labeled creative while skilled ones are
forced out of business.1 6' Accordingly, a better-defined and
more categorical compromise is needed. If a potential lawsuit
threatens every artist that accurately depicts a celebrity, then
the incentive to create artistic depictions will be entirely lost.
157. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 810.
158. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003).
159. Id.
160. See generally Dougherty, supra note 6, at 1.
161. Levine, supra note 6, at 219.
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This will certainly stifle creativity in the public domain.
B. The Weaknesses of the Predominant Purpose Test
The predominant purpose test looks at whether the
product being sold predominately exploits the commercial
value of an individual's identity, even if it contains some
expressive content that qualifies as speech in other
circumstances.162 This test is even less effective than the
transformative use test. First, it fails to explain how courts
should determine the predominant purpose of a challenged
use that is both highly expressive and also commercial.'63
Second, by placing significant value on whether a work
receives commercial benefit, the test undermines the value of
free expression and unintentionally stifles creativity.
The predominant purpose test articulated in Doe asks
whether the use of a person's name and identity is
"expressive," in which case it is protected, or "commercial," in
which case it is generally not protected. 6 1 Consequently, this
test fails to address an entire category of works: those that
are both highly, if not equally, expressive and commercial.
For example, even if Andy Warhol's portrait of Marilyn
Monroe 165 had been created in order to make prints or sell T-
shirts, then under the transformative use test, the portrait
would have received First Amendment protection. However,
under the predominant purpose test, the result for the same
portrait is unclear. If Warhol's intent was predominately to
use Marilyn Monroe's likeness in order to sell reproductions
of his work, it is unclear whether his work would be given
First Amendment protection under the predominant purpose
test even though it is difficult to deny that Warhol's work is
highly expressive.
The Doe court criticized Comedy Il's transformative use
test for giving "too little consideration to the fact that many
uses of a person's name and identity have both expressive and
commercial components." 66 However, this contention lacks
162. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
163. Recent Case, First Amendment-Right of Publicity, supra note 140, at
1280.
164. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
165. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal.
2001).
166. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
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merit. While the transformative use test is more focused on
who produces a celebrity image and who appropriates value
from its production, certain forms of expressive activity fall
outside the boundaries of the First Amendment.167 This does
not mean the test fails to recognize that the use of a person's
identity can have both expressive and commercial
components. Rather, the Doe court acted too hastily in
denying First Amendment protection to works that are
commercial, 168 and it effectively undermined the precedent
that commercial speech receives First Amendment
protection. 169
It may be difficult to determine what is meant by
"predominant" under the predominant purpose test because it
is possible for a work to be equally expressive and
commercial. In Doe, the court found evidence of commercial
value based on the fact that Twist made out a prima facie
case that the defendants had used his name for commercial
gain.170  However, this finding is circular because the
plaintiffs prima facie case is necessary to reach the
defendant's First Amendment defense."1 Therefore, as one
commentator points out, the predominant purpose test, like
the transformative use test, will usually turn on expressive
value and is "little more than a heightened incarnation of the
California test."1 7
2
When the Doe court found against First Amendment
protection, it downplayed the literary value of the comic book
character and instead emphasized that the identity of the
celebrity's name had "become predominantly a ploy to sell
comic books and related products." 78 Prominence invites
creative comment,1 74 and by dismissing the literary value of
167. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 811.
168. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 372-73.
169. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980).
170. Recent Case, First Amendment-Right of Publicity, supra note 140, at
1280.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
174. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979)
(Bird, C.J., concurring). See also David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The
Terminator as Eraser: How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity
to Terminate Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651,
659 (2005) (arguing that courts frequently "view these cases as a
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the comic book character, the court essentially gave
censorship power to celebrities that is available to them when
they are unhappy with certain depictions of their identities.
At the same time, the court essentially destroyed the value of
the artist's metaphorical expression.175  The court's
preoccupation with the defendant's commercial purpose
ignored the fact that in entertainment, the expression and the
commercial nature of the work or product that embodies this
expression go hand in hand.
C. Comparing the Transformative Use and Predominant
Purpose Tests
Applied alone, Missouri's predominant purpose test does
not provide guidance toward the achievement of a balance
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
Although the transformative use test is far from perfect, it
comparatively is still more comprehensive than the
predominant purpose test because it recognizes the
importance of protecting expression. An examination of a
case similar to Doe, decided through an application of the
transformative use test 176 will be helpful in exhibiting this
position. In Winter v. DC Comics, unlike in Doe, the
California Supreme Court held that DC Comics' use of the
celebrity's likeness was protected speech.177 The plaintiffs
argued there was evidence that the defendants traded on the
plaintiffs likeness and reputation in order to generate
interest in the comic book and to increase sales. 78 The court
held that the marketing of the comic book was irrelevant to
whether or not the comic book was constitutionally protected
expression 17 9 because under the transformative use test, the
way in which a transformative work is advertised cannot
misappropriation of a plaintiffs property right solely for commercial purposes,
as if the 'property' was a copyrighted work that was being duplicated for profit,
rather than as a commentary about a person whose celebrity status is
legitimately the subject of public scrutiny").
175. For example, the right to comment on the violence in society and the
mafia by using hockey (a violent sport) and an athlete with a reputation for
being a tough guy.
176. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
177. Id. at 476.
178. Id. at 479.
179. Id.
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make the work non-transformative.180  If the court had
adopted the predominant purpose test, the marketing of the
comic book and its related merchandise would certainly have
made the use predominantly commercial, regardless of DC
Comics' initial intent.
The transformative use test attempts to resolve the
controversy between "the recognized stature of art as speech
and the protected status of commercial dissemination of
speech."81  For example, unconditionally protecting an
artist's right to use a celebrity's likeness would also allow
creators of other merchandise embodying an image of the
celebrity to seek protection.18 2  This would lead to a
significant loss of economic rights for celebrities l8 3 and may be
unfair because a celebrity might invest significant time
developing his or her persona. On the other hand, if the court
wholly denied constitutional protection to artistic endeavors,
despite a determination that the work clearly embodies
expression, it would violate the First Amendment. 84  It is
difficult to draw a line, but one must be drawn. Otherwise,
we will end up with a standard that is essentially categorical
"under which some art would be fully protected speech under
the First Amendment but other art would be treated as mere
merchandise." 8 5 Thus, courts should adopt a standard that
looks at both the commercial nature of the work as well as the
level of transformation embodied in the work and set out
guidelines to determine circumstances under which a work
passes the threshold of transformation.
V. PROPOSAL
Society's interests are best served if the transformative
use test meets both the goals of the First Amendment and the
goals of intellectual property. The First Amendment has two
commonly acknowledged purposes. First, it preserves "an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas"' and repels efforts to limit
180. Id. at 479-80. If the way in which a transformative work is advertised
makes it non-transformative, the First Amendment would be completely
undermined. See id.
181. Dougherty, supra note 6, at 28.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Id.
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robust and wide-open public debate. 186 Second, it protects a
"fundamental respect for individual development and self-
realization."1 87 By extension, an artist's creation plays a role
in the achievement of these First Amendment goals. Be it a
photograph,'88 portrait, 8 9 painting, 19° or comic book,' 9' each of
these creations contribute to the marketplace of ideas. On
the other hand, celebrities are already given sizeable
economic incentives for their creations and achievements. 192
Therefore, it is unrealistic to argue that celebrities would not
maintain their fame simply because someone gained an
economic benefit as well. 193  In comparison to celebrities,
however, most artists will find that their economic incentives
to create are stifled by a celebrity's claimed publicity right.
The United States Supreme Court has not granted
certiorari to any right of publicity case since Zacchini.'94 This
is especially unfortunate for state and lower federal courts
that would benefit from the existence of a definitive analysis
for balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
Until the Supreme Court accepts a case, one solution may be
for Congress to enact legislation to implement a test with
clear standards that outlines situations in which the First
Amendment trumps the right of publicity. Unlike its
authority over the areas of patents and copyrights, however,
Congress does not have express constitutional authority to
regulate the right of publicity. Nevertheless, Congress may
find authority under the Commerce Clause.' 95
Another solution is to replace both the transformative
use and predominant purpose tests with bright-line
186. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979)
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969)).
187. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 458 (Bird, C.J., concurring)..
188. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
189. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d 797.
190. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
191. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Doe v. TCI Cablevision,
110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
192. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 938 (finding that "[e]ven in the absence of his
right of publicity, [Tiger Woods] would still be able to reap substantial financial
rewards from authorized appearances and endorsements").
193. See id.
194. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have Power . .. [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States....").
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categories that clearly delineate which products of expression
are protected. 196  As one commentator has observed, "[i]f,
ultimately, non-advertising uses of expressive works
depicting real people are not categorically protected from
right of publicity claims, then at a minimum, visual artists
should be protected from such claims when they sell copies of
their works not incorporated in unrelated merchandise."197
This proposal is much more objectionable than any balancing
test. While bright line categories may provide more
consistent results in theory, flexibility allows for more
equitable results. For example, a bright line rule against
commercial merchandise will exclude highly expressive work.
Moreover, within the general category of commercial
merchandise, it is especially difficult to draw the line. For
example, what is the difference between a work of art on
canvas, as opposed to the same work printed in a magazine or
a T-shirt?
The best solution is modification of the transformative
use test. It should lay out more distinct standards to
determine when artwork becomes transformative, and force
courts to apply these standards consistently. If
transformativeness is "more than a 'merely trivial' variation"
that recognizably belongs to the artist,9 ' then original works
of art should be protected under the First Amendment, even if
they duplicate the likeness of a celebrity. Under this
standard, the medium of expression is irrelevant; thus, it is of
no consequence whether the expression is placed on canvas,
on paper, or on a T-shirt. Although the marketability of the
challenged work and its derivation from the status of the
celebrity depicted should be considered in assessing the
transformativeness of a work, this factor should not be
conclusive and should not lead to a result where an
expressive work with transformative elements is deemed
nontransformative. Creativity, skill, and intent of the artist
are subjective factors, but nevertheless relevant when
determining whether a work should be protected under the
196. See Dougherty, supra note 6, at 34-41.
197. Id. at 78. Under this standard, any artwork or photograph portraying
an individual in the form of print, posters, lithographs, or other reproductions,
without regard to transformativeness, would be protected, while unrelated
image merchandise such as T-shirts would not be protected. Id. at 73.
198. L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976).
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First Amendment.
The transformative use test should also place the burden
of proof on the plaintiff to prove non-transformativeness
rather than on the defendant to prove transformativeness.
Logically, the plaintiff is better positioned to identify
elements that make a work a mere reproduction as opposed to
something expressive. Few artistic endeavors are ever truly
original because, more often than not, they derive, at least in
part, from previously existing works or ideas. In addition,
from the point of view of the defendant, a work is always his
or her original interpretation.
The goal of intellectual property rights is to encourage a
rich and creative public domain. The Constitution expressly
states that patents and copyrights are given for the purpose
of promoting the "Progress of Science and useful Arts ... ."199
Of all the intellectual property rights, the right of publicity
falls closest to being an individual, natural right, inherent in
all people. For this reason, most celebrities work hard to
create and maintain their status as celebrities. Where the
fruits of their labor are exploited, free-riding occurs, leading
to unjust enrichment. However, the First Amendment is very
central to the functioning of a democratic society,200 so it
would be dangerous to limit creative freedom. Balancing the
interests, celebrities are less likely to be affected when their
publicity rights are abrogated, than artists whose First
Amendment rights are restricted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Protection of a celebrity's right to publicity, while still
encouraging creativity, requires careful balancing by courts.
Although celebrities are private individuals, their influence
and presence in popular culture is often so pervasive that
their names, likenesses, images, characters, and identities
are naturally part of the public domain. The purpose behind
having a public domain is so that all members of society may
draw from it and subsequently add to it. As such, when
economic rights of individuals encroach upon a more
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
200. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979)
(Bird, C.J., concurring); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d
797, 803 (Cal. 2001).
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compelling public interest, the economic rights should yield.
The United States Supreme Court should intervene to resolve
variations among lower courts as to how the competing rights
should be balanced. In the absence of such intervention,
however, Congress should codify a clear and consistent test to
which courts can adhere. Courts applying the proper
transformative use test would help strike the correct balance
between competing public and private interests. Ideally, such
balance will encourage celebrities and those who depict
celebrities to continue to add to the public domain, the former
through the characters they embody, the latter through their
works of art.

